EnteleWALLET PR #277

Preflight Audit completed the technical first-party release-assurance review of EnteleWALLET PR #277 and the controlled release-governance sequence that followed the controller trust-root rotation. The permanent-controller Ed25519 GO was verified for source candidate afade3aae4890eb8ecc79941fa52b8accb03e66c and canonical v1 digest a449ab3515f8b72de9b156f8aacf89415310b07d4e5cc2466982bf0eedad98e2. The final PR head c43995ecd9b2f99a2f39bb3ec89be1fac070556b completed the principal CI, Market Readiness, Static Security Analysis, wallet-link database and MEV-reservation database gates successfully, and PR #277 merged as b7462da0043bfec736f5348d5993bcce46cfcfc7. The short-lived controller acceptance was valid for the release decision and expired afterward as designed. The Preflight engagement remains in reporting pending controlled QMS QA/signatory completion, so this public assessment remains Pending Review. The capability-scoped v2 bundle is 1132 files with SHA-256 f080e4b15825f486f453de27831fd847474108901057ac52a09811775f1d8dbc.

• Rotated permanent-controller Ed25519 GO verified for the exact accepted source candidate and canonical v1 digest before merge
• Final-head CI completed successfully with quality gates, production build, Playwright smoke tests, Android API 30/API 36, EnteleCLOS and PostgreSQL harnesses passing
• Final-head Market Readiness, Static Security Analysis, wallet-link database security and MEV reservation database gates completed successfully
• PR #277 merged as b7462da0043bfec736f5348d5993bcce46cfcfc7
• REL-001 release-governance finding is resolved; the remaining Pending Review state is a QMS reporting/QA-signatory boundary, not a missing controller signature

1. 01Complete the controlled QMS QA and authorized-signatory review before changing the public assessment from Pending Review or issuing any Preflight verification record
2. 02Retain the immutable controller-GO and source-bundle evidence together with the final PR head, merge commit and successful gate references
3. 03Treat the expired short-lived controller acceptance as historical release evidence only; do not reuse it as authorization for a later source candidate
4. 04Keep Swap, Staking, native self-custody and physical-device validation under their separate fail-closed gates
5. 05Re-assess the affected capability after material wallet, signing, transaction-construction or release-governance changes